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Summary findings
Policies and procedures to resolve bank failures have  The author examines this practice in detail by
evolved significantly in Argentina since the introduction  considering the handling of the recent failure of Banco
of currency convertibility in 1991 and particularly in  Almafuerte.
reaction to the  199S "tequila" crisis, which exposed the  The author assesses  a number of issues that arise from
inadequacy of the bank exit framework in place then. De  the Argentine model of bank failure resolution, taking
la Torre reviews the institutional changes introduced in  into account both country-specific circumstances and
Argentina in 1995 to handle bank failures more  more general concepts and concerns. He emphasizes the
effectively, particularly the creation of the deposit  potential tradeoffs between reducing contagion risk,
guarantee scheme and the procedural framework for  limiting moral hazard, and avoiding unnecessary
resolving bank failures, embedded in Article 35 of the  destruction of asset value; the implications of priority-of-
Financial Institutions Law.  claims rules and least-cost criteria; the pros and cons of
This framework enables the Central Bank to carve out  alternative organizational and institutional arrangements;
the assets and "privileged" liabilities of the failing bank  and the need for legal security. Finally, he outlines two
and transfer them to sound banks, thereby sending only a  prototypical  approaches to striking a balance between
"residual" balance sheet to judicial liquidation.  rules and discretion, an issue underlying much of the
Subsequent refinements in the application of Article 35  ongoing policy discussion on alternative bank exit
procedures eventually led to current Argentine practice.  frameworks.
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at www.worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  The author  may be contacted  at adelatorreCaworldbank.org.  March
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ARGENTINA:  BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION
Recent Developments  and Issues
By Augusto de la Torre'
This paper was prepared to serve as an input to the Interagency  Committee created to
review Argentine bank failure resolution processes and bank governance issues.  The
Committee held its first  meeting in Buenos  Aires during  March 29-30,  1999.1
The paper is structured as follows.  The first  section reviews the evolution of bank failure
resolution in Argentina since 1991.  The second describes in some detail a recent case,
that  of Banco Almafuerte,  as an illustration  of the bank resolution  model emerging in
present day Argentina.  The third  and most extensive section reviews key general and
Argentine-specific issues in bank failure resolution.  The paper ends with some
concluding remarks on the topic of rules versus discretion.
1.  Background:  From 1991  to the Present
Bank failure resolution policies and procedures have evolved significantly  in Argentina
since the introduction of Convertibility  in 1991.  This evolution  has reflected a
remarkable ability quickly to adapt -within  the constraints imposed by Convertibility
Law-  the normative,  organizational, and procedural frameworks to deal with  bank
failures in the midst of the stress caused by two adverse exogenous shocks:  the major
Tequila shock of 1995 and the relatively  more benign financial turbulence unleashed
since the second half of 1997 by the South East Asian and Russian crises.  In adapting
the bank failure resolution, the authorities have sought to strike an appropriate  balance
between the two objectives of averting contagion and limiting  moral hazard.
* Lead  Specialist,  Financial  Sector,  Latin  American  and  the Caribbean  Region,  The World  Bank.
The  author  wishes  to acknowledge  the comments  provided  by Stefan  Alber,  Aquiles  Almansi,
Federico  Caparros-Bosch,  Gerard  Caprio,  Asli Demirguc-Kunt,  Jonathan  Fiechter,  Paul  Levy,  and
Margery  Waxman. The normal  disclaimers  apply.
1 The Interagency  Committee  is chaired  by Central  Bank  Governor  Pedro  Pou  and integrated  by
representatives  from SEDESA,  the banking  associations,  and  the Economic  Research  and Bank
Supervision  department  of the Central  Bank. Robert  Litan  and Brian  Quinn  participated  in the
March  1999  meeting  of the Committee  as external  advisors  and I joined representing  the World
Bank. This  paper was  revised  and updated  in light of the discussions  held  during such  meeting
and  the material provided  for it by the Argentine  Central  Bank  authorities.2
In  1991, at the beginning of the Convertibility  Plan, Argentina had a bare-bones system
of bank failure resolution: troubled banks unable to restore compliance with  key
prudential norms, particularly those associated with  solvency and/or liquidity,  would
automatically see their license removed and go on to judicial  liquidation.2 Under such
system -not  unlike those existing today in many Latin American countries-  there was
neither an explicit deposit insurance scheme nor resolution procedures other than
judicial  liquidation,  implying that,  in the event of a bank failure, all deposits would
immediately turn  illiquid and value-impaired.  Depositors would have to wait  in line for a
long time (months and even years) to have access  to the liquidation  proceeds.  Given
the protracted,  legally assailable, and cumbersome nature of the judicial  liquidation
process, a sharp destruction of  asset value would take place compared to their going
concern value.  Under these circumstances, depositors derived little consolation from
their  relatively high position in the priority of claims ladder -just  below labor claims.
By featuring a clear risk of loss to depositors, this bare-bones system of bank resolution
sought to minimize moral hazard -an objective that was gladly embraced in reaction to
the huge Central Bank losses  and runaway inflation that had resulted from previous
episodes of banking crises and bailouts in Argentina.  The system aimed at encouraging
depositors to monitor the condition of banks and impose discipline on them,  both by
asking for higher interest rates when depositing in banks perceived to be riskier and by
withdrawing  deposits from banks perceived to be nonviable.  This type of system was
particularly stringent  in the case of Argentina because of Convertibility,  which severely
limits the authorities'  room to elude or significantly delay the liquidation of a troubled
bank by keeping it afloat with  Central Bank liquidity.3
The 1995 Tequila quickly made it plain that the bare-bones system was ill suited to
manage bank failures -particularly  in the case of large banks-  while adequately limiting
2 The Central  Bank  has  the power  to establish  terms  and conditions  for rehabilitation  plans  (planes
de regularizaci6n  y saneamiento)  under  which troubled  banks  are given  the opportunity  to correct
their problems  so as to restore  financial  viability. Noncompliance  with such  plans  is a cause  for
removal  of the license  and, hence,  the beginning  of judicial liquidation.
3 To be  sure, under  Argentine  Convertibility  there is a margin,  equivalent  to at least  one-third  of
the money  base,  for Central  Bank  liquidity assistance  to the banking  system. The Central  Bank
can issue  money  to advance  liquidity to banks  inasmuch  as disposable  international  reserves
exceed  money  base. Furthermore,  disposable  reserves  are defined  to include  dollar denominated
(and internationally  traded) bonds  issued  by the Republic  of Argentina,  provided  that such  bonds
do not exceed  one  third of total disposable  reserves.3
contagion risk.  At the outset of the Tequila, the system led to the liquidation of some
banks.  But it was soon observed that a resolution framework  purely consisting of
judicial  liquidation was intensifying deposit runs, dangerously magnifying the erosion of
confidence and propagating distress.  Under such circumstances, the authorities
introduced in the first  half of 1995 three important institutional  innovations directly
relevant to bank failure resolution.  Two of these innovations -the  reforms to the
Financial Institutions  Law and the creation of a Deposit Guarantee Scheme-  were
meant to be permanent,  i.e., to endure beyond the Tequila juncture.  The third,
consisting of the creation of a Bank Capitalization Trust Fund, was seen as a transitional
crisis management tool, although its two-year life was subsequently extended until
February 2000.
As regards the first  innovation, the core reform of the Financial Institutions  Law (No.
21.526)  introduced in 1995 is embodied in Article 35 bis.  This article empowers the
Central Bank to carry out a no-frills,  minimalist version of a "good  bank/bad bank"
resolution procedure, with the failing  bank normally closed but before its liquidation
proper.  This procedure consists of:  (i) separating from the liability  side of the failing
bank the privileged liabilities,  namely, liabilities to labor, deposits of the public, and
debts to the Central Bank; (ii)  carving out assets from the asset side; and (ii)
transferring  the assets and liabilities thus separated to another existing financial
institution,  ensuring "equivalence"  between the transferred assets and deposits.  The
procedure can be applied, at the sole discretion of the Central Bank, to a bank deemed
to be nonviable and prior to the removal of its license, 4 with the  result that  only the
residual or "bad" bank (containing the assets and liabilities that were not separated and
transferred) would go on to judicial  liquidation.
This type of good bank/bad bank surgery is underpinned by a priority  of claims queue
for unsecured claims, according to which employees stand ahead of depositors,
depositors before the Central Bank, and the Central Bank ahead of other claims on the
failing bank.  There is no room for bailing out bank shareholders under Article  35 bis;
shareholders are always left in the residual bank.  Additionally,  the Central Bank is given
in the Law what appears to be ample authority  to eliminate or substantially  dilute the
4 A bank may be  deemed  nonviable,  and  thus subject to the revocation  of its license  when, in the
sole  opinion  of the Central  Bank,  its solvency  and/or liquidity position  is so weak  that it cannot be
restored  to health  via a rehabilitation  plan (see  Article  44 of Law  No. 21.526).4
property  rights of shareholders, including by writing down their capital against identified
losses and required increases in provisions, or by revoking their  right to be in the
banking business, even prior to the application of Article 35 bis.
Article 35 bis would seem to imply that claims with  priority  lower than that  of the Central
Bank must always stay in the residual ("bad")  bank and await the results of the judicial
liquidation.  As a consequence, the good bank/bad bank separation provided for under
this Article  must normally be performed with the bank closed; for if it were open, non-
depositor creditors would engineer a run to avoid the losses associated with  being
relegated to the residual bank. 5
The second institutional  innovation consisted in the creation of a Deposit Guarantee
Scheme (Sistema de Seguro de Garantia de los Dep6sitos Bancarios) via Law No.
24.485.  This scheme is composed of a Fondo de Garantia de Dep6sitos (FGD) and a
corporation, the Seguro de Dep6sitos Sociedad  An6nima (SEDESA), which administers
the FDG. SEDESA  offers a guarantee, per depositor, of up to US$30,000, provided that
the interest rate paid on such deposits does not exceed a certain level. 6 The FGD is fed
by mandatory contributions  paid by the banking industry.  The Central Bank has
flexibility  in setting the rate of contribution within a range -from  a minimum of 0.015
percent to a maximum  of 0.06 percent of average daily  deposits-  and may require the
advanced payment of up to two years of contributions.  Within the 0.015 to 0.06  percent
range, the Central Bank may levy different assessments on different  banks, according to
their  risk, as measured by the CAMEL  ratings established by the Superintendency of
Banks.  The investment and uses of the FGD  are governed by an Executive Committee
made up by representatives from the contributing financial institutions;  the Central Bank
has one representative  in such Committee, who lacks voting  power but has veto power.
In the event of a bank failure,  SEDESA  could use FGD resources to pay guaranteed
deposits in cash, in which case it has the special right to get payments from the
liquidation before all non-guaranteed depositors.  However, SEDESA  is not confined to
S More  precisely,  the procedure  of Article 35 bis to create  and  transfer  the "good" bank is applied
while the failing bank  is under a so-called  periodo  de suspensi6n  transitoria,  which suspends  its
operation. After this period,  the license  of the failing bank is removed  and  judicial liquidation  of
the residual  ("bad") bank begins.
6  Not covered  by the guarantee  are also  related-party  deposits  and  deposits  made  by other
financial  institutions. (Inter-bank  deposits  are in effect no  classified  as  "deposits", per generally
accepted  accounting  principles  for banking.)5
the cash payout option when honoring the deposit guarantee.  The Executive Committee
may also authorize the use of FGD  resources to inject  capital into, or make a loan,
including a non-reimbursable  one, to:  (i) a financial institution  under a rehabilitation
plan; (ii) a financial institution  that  purchases the assets and assumes the deposits of a
bank that is under the Article 35  bis procedure; or (iii)  a financial  institution  that  buys a
bank that is under a rehabilitation  plan.  Any of these three operations may be
authorized if, in doing so, the direct cost to the FGD is lower than what it would be if the
cash payout route were followed.  Clearly, the second of these three alternatives  to a
cash payout of guaranteed deposits has the potential of enhancing significantly the
flexibility  of the sort of good bank/bad bank resolution procedure contemplated in Article
35  bis -a flexibility  that  has been often seized by the authorities.
The third  innovation introduced in the first  half of 1995  was the creation, by Decree
445/95,  of a Bank Capitalization Trust Fund (Fondo Fiduciario de Capitalizaci6n
Bancaria).  This Trust Fund has been fed mainly by budgetary transfers financed via a
special bond issue (the Bono Argentina 1998) as well as the proceeds from loans
granted by multilateral  organizations, including by the World Bank under the 1995
Argentina Bank Reform Loan.  The Trust Fund was designed to strengthen the hand of
the authorities in dealing with the banking system turmoil  created by the Tequila.
According to the decree, the Trust Fund is empowered to inject capital into financial
institutions directly,  including by making loans convertible into equity,  or indirectly,  by
buying the illiquid assets of distressed financial entities.  In practice, the Trust Fund has
utilized only two instruments in assisting financial institutions:  a long term collateralized
loan; and a noncollateralized subordinated loan, convertible into a negotiable obligation.
The authorities have used the Trust Fund to foster consolidation in the banking system,
via assisted bank mergers, acquisitions, and capitalization.7 Where these transactions
turned out to be nonviable, the Trust Fund has absorbed losses, thereby facilitating  the
construction of the "good" bank under Article 35  bis procedures.
7 The Bank  Capitalization  Trust Fund  (BCTF)  disbursed  a total of US$767  million  to facilitate
acquisitions,  mergers,  and  restructuring  of private banks  whose  pre-Tequila  assets  totaled
US$14.6  billion. At present,  the BCTF  is not active and  virtually has no funds. For an in depth
assessment  of the role played  by the BCTF  in the consolidation  process  of the Argentine  banking
industry  see  Implementation  Completion  Report  - Argentina:  Provincial  Bank  Privatization  (Loan
3878-AR)  and Bank  Reform  Loan  (Loan  3926-AR),  Report  No. 61733,  June  30, 1999,  The World
Bank.6
Taken jointly,  the three institutional  innovations mentioned above contributed  to
preventing what could have otherwise been a banking system meltdown unleashed by
the Tequila.  The increase in moral hazard that  may have resulted from the bailout of
large depositors that  these innovations afforded in some cases, can be rightly  considered
to have been a small price paid in order to limit  contagion risk under the turbulent
financial environment  unleashed by the Tequila.  Moreover, a systemic crises was
avoided with very little  use of public sector resources, particularly  when compared to
international experiences.  In part due to these institutional  innovations, since 1995 the
authorities have broadly succeeded in promoting an orderly  process of consolidation and
strengthening of the banking system, 8 with striking  results. 9
In the period July 1995 to April 1999 the Argentine authorities  resolved 18 failures of
financial intermediaries using the powers under Article 35 bis (Table 1).  The liabilities of
the resolved institutions  added to around US$5 billion, with the median size bank in the
group featuring  liabilities of around US$210 million and the largest case (Banco Mayo)
with  liabilities for some US$1.3 billion.  In  12 of these 18 cases, SEDESA  resources were
used to facilitate  the execution of Article 35 bis procedure -essentially  by completing the
asset side of the "good" bank-  for a sum total of around US$750 million, equivalent to
nearly 20 percent of the liabilities separated and transferred  under Art. 35 bis
procedures.  The Capitalization Trust Fund provided, to the same end, a total of US$382
million, which were distributed  over 10 cases.
8 To be  sure, other factors have played  a major role in the system's  consolidation  and
strengthening.  These  factors include:  a marked  improvement  in prudential  oversight  and its
enforcement;  the enhancement  of market monitoring  via, for instance,  improved  accounting  and
disclosure  standards  and  the requirement  that banks  issue  subordinated  debt on a regular  basis;
the privatization  of public  sector banks;  the full opening  of the banking  sector  to foreign capital;
tougher-than-Basle  capital requirements;  and  stringent  liquidity requirements. For  details  see
Argentina:  Financial  Sector  Review,  Report  No. 17864-AR,  September  28, 1998,  The World  Bank.
9 The  number  of financial  institutions  in the Argentine  system  fell from 205 at end-1994  to around
130  at end-1998. Over  the same  period,  the number  of foreign-owned  banks  rose  from 30 to 42,
with their share  in the system's  deposits  increasing  from 16 percent  to about 55 percent. In
respect  of publicly  owned  banks,  BANADE,  the former development  bank, was  closed,  and 15
provincial  banks  were privatized.7
Table 1
Summary of Bank Failure Resolution Cases: July 1995  - April 1999
(In  millions  of  pesos,  wless  otlxrue  spei)
Date  Failed  Finmcial  Acquiring  uin  Assets  Liabilites  Total  Deposits  Deposits  Sedesa  BCTF
Institution  Separated  Separated  Liabilities  Separated  Assumed
&  &  &  by
Transferre  Transferred  Transfered! Acquiring  bution  bution
v  .---__ _  . d  __  Institution1
Jul-95  Banco  de Cnel. Dorrego  &IBco.  de la Pampa  109.2  109.2  130.8  91.8  100%  54.9
Trenque  Lauquen  S.A.
Aug-95 Tarraubela  S.A.  (1)  La Indusrial CF SA  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.4  100%
Aug-95 Creditos  Luro S.A.  Cia.  Bco.  Velox  SA/Invercred  20.2  20.2  20.2  11.8  100%
Fdera.(2)  CiaFciera/Trusteeship
Dec-95 Banco  Federal  Argentino  Banco  Bansud  S.A.  157.4  163.9  212.2  104.7  100%  60.0
SA.
Dec-95 Banco  del  Fuerte S.A.  lBanco  Velox  S.A.  19.5  19.5  21.2  14.7  100%  10.5
Nov-96 Banco  Caseros  S.A.  Bco.  Credito  Argentino  166.7  223.7  249.6  74  100%  73.7  60.0
S.A./Frances
Mar-97 Banco  Coopesur  CL  Bco.  Credicoop  CL  66.8  103.1  107.2  100.6  100%  39.8  15.0
Apr-97 Banco  Union Comercial  e  Corp Banca  SA.  436.5  382.5  436.8  295.9  100%  117.9  35.0
Industrial  S.A.
May-97 Nuevo Banco  de Azul S.A. Nuevo  Banco  Industrial  de  18.5  25.2  25.9  23.0  100%  8.6  5.0
|Azul  S.A.
Dec-97 Banco  Argencoop  Bco.  Credicoop  CL  137.8  188.8  210.9  184.2  100%  60.0  40.0
Dec-97 Banco  Credito  Provincial  Mercobank  282.0  337.3  506.2  192.9  60%  87.0
S.A.(3)
Apr-97 Banco  Platense  SA. (4)  Nuevo  Banco de la Rioja  1.4  1.4  1.4  58%
S.A.  18.0
Apr-97 Banco  Platense  S-A.  Bco.  Municipal  de la Plata  18.2  31.2  51.6  24.0  58%
Jun-98  Banco  Patricios  S.A.  Banco  Mayo  C.L.  335.1  336.04  405.6  331.3  100%  121.3  46.3
Jun-98  BancoMedefinUNB  S.A.  Trusteein favorto Bco.  161.3  161.7  381.6  105.5  100%
Finansur  S.A.
Oct-98 Banco  Mayo  C.L. (5)  Citibank  NA., Suc.  1,046.3  1,060.3  1,316.2  707.6  100%  350.0  60.0
Argentina
Nov-98 Banco  Almafuerte  C.L.(6)  Group of Banks  203.3  203.3  266.7  165.0  (7)  100%/  60.0
Feb-99 Bco.  Israelita  de C6rdoba  Group of Banks (8)  168.5  168.5  199.7  168.4  100%0/  60.01
Abr-99 Bco.  de Mendoza  Group of Banks (9)  385.6  385.61  477.9  368.2  100%  100.0
3,738.6  3,924.7i  5,024.01  2,968.0  97%  746,4i  381.8
Source: Central  Bank of Argentina.
(1)  C(a de  Criitos  La Indusbial  CL. asswmuldepositsfor  $0.59morilio,  s  eich  lwih tbel  estatenothxrassets, easfor  de aallation of$0.973  mill
wrdeposits  a  stfiduas  caratd
(2)  A trasrfia4swasestaHliseto  andqepsitsfor  $4.8  million.
(3)  MeoAk  S.A. asswnd  liabdities  for  $251  mion Deposits  mai  by  te guarte of SEDESA  sese  totally  ca  30% of  some  $0.5  ln  i  deposits  was
calipzaszand  the nawig  70%  smass  sesledacig  to  thepmrns  of  Resoltion  742/97
(4)  "T--"gliailiesda weoe  a--  sedby-mms  of theapplicaon  ofArtile 49 d) of  the  Banking  Law.  Pmilquideposis  for $19.8  millinuere  not  ca
(5)  Pelvay  Data
(6)  Balmae  Sheet  as of 10.31.98.  The  grup of acquiring  banks  was  formed  by Bisel  S.A., Cniakoop  CL., Frands  S.A., Galicia  and  Buenos  Aires  S.A., Macen  Misiones
S.A., R  io Negro  S.A., San  Juan  S.A.,  and  Del  Suqw6'  S.  A..
(7)  Esti6natedDepositsas  ofl1.3 0.98.
(8)  The  groupof  acqungbankswasfomed  by  Bisel .A., Suqua  LSA.,  Supmll  Sneis,  BNL, and  Mac-n  SA.
(9)  7he grup of  acquiring  banks  wasfomsed  by  BB V Francis .A., Crdicoop  Coop.  Ltdo., Galiciay  Buenos  Aires SA.,  Banw Nacin Argnina,  San  Juan
S.A., Robeyts  S.A., Macro  Misiones  S.A., Del Suquza  S.A, and Velox S.A.8
Resolution processes under Article  35 bis, while representing a dramatic improvement
over judicial  liquidation,  often proved to be protracted.  Over time,  however, the
Argentine authorities  have accumulated experience, refined tools and procedures, and
streamlined execution.  The recent case of Banco Almafuerte may be seen as an
illustration  that bank failure resolution in Argentina has come of age.  However, the same
case puts into sharp focus a number of issues  that  need careful assessment.
2.  The Emerging  New Model of Bank Resolution-the case of Banco  Almafuerte
Banco  Almafuerte Coop. Ltdo. was a relatively small bank by Argentine standards, with
total  liabilities of about US$270 million.  Its failure was effectively resolved  over a
weekend,  a major achievement even after considering that  its size, for it stands in
sharp contrast with almost all prior cases that took weeks or even months.  This is all the
more impressive considering that  -as was mentioned earlier-  the resolution procedure
of Article 35 bis can be performed realistically only with the failing  bank's doors closed.  A
long period of closed doors is bound to cause not only severe irritation  among the bank's
creditors but also a deterioration  in the value of its assets.  Under unsettled financial
markets, furthermore,  delays in executing the Article 35 bis procedure could also lead to
contagious deposit runs.  In the case of Almafuerte, these problems were avoided, as its
doors were for only a couple days and during a time (a weekend) when they would have
been closed anyhow.  In resolving Almafuerte, the Central Bank authorities combined
innovative financial engineering with the full range of powers under Article 35 bis, as well
as with the powers granted to the Executive Committee of the FGD.
Annex 1 presents a simplified numerical example of a bank resolution based on the
approach used in the case of Almafuerte.  The example -whose  numbers bear no
resemblance to the actual case-  should help the reader visualize more clearly the
description of Almafuerte's  resolution provided below.
A main source of delays in executing the good bank/bad bank surgery contemplated in
Article 35 bis has been the time required for due diligence in order reasonably to
estimate the value of assets.  In the case of Almafuerte,  this hurdle was overcome by a
form of asset securitization,  that  is, by placing the assets (other than cash) of
Almafuerte into a Trust (Fideicomiso)  that,  in turn,  issued bonds backed by those assets.
The Trust issued three classes of bonds: A, B, and C.  Bonds type A were structured to be
senior to B, and B Bonds senior to C Bonds.  That is, in the event of a shortage of9
resources  in the Trust, B Bonds  would be serviced  only if there are resources  left over
after servicing  A Bonds,  with C Bonds  standing  a similar relation  of subordination  relative
to B Bonds. To reduce  the probability  of default, particularly with respect  to A Bonds,  the
book  value of assets  placed  in the Trust was substantially  higher than the total face value
of bonds  it issued  (a ratio of assets  to bonds  of about 1.50 to 1.00).
This  version  of asset  securitization  permitted a quick construction  of the "good"
bank. In effect, 8 good banks  were assembled  during  Almafuerte's  resolution,  because
there were 8 existing financial  institutions that participated  in acquiring  the assets  and
assuming  the deposits  of such  "good" banks. The  "good" banks were put together in line
with the geographic  distribution of the Almafuerte's  branch network. Each  "good" bank
contained,  in the liability side,  the debts  to labor and the deposits  corresponding  to the
branches  in a given  geographic  area and, in the asset  side,  three assets: cash,  A Bonds,
and an IOU  from SEDESA  for an amount up to the corresponding  guaranteed  deposits.1 0
There  were, consequently,  as many Trusts  containing  Almafuerte's  assets  as "good"
banks. As required  by Article 35 bis, the asset  and liability sides  of each  "good" bank
were matched,  implying a zero  accounting  net worth, with the IOU  from SEDESA
covering  the shortfall in assets  relative  to liabilities. Each  "good" bank was  transferred
"as is" to the acquirer,  who did not make  any explicit payment in respect  of the franchise
value. This reflected  the concerted  nature of the operation,  with the Central  Bank
playing a major coordinating  role. Each  acquirer  bank took on, for a fee, the
responsibility  of managing,  recovering,  or selling  the assets  in the corresponding  Trust.
Central Bank claims  on Almafuerte,  resulting  from the liquidity assistance  it had
provided  to that bank before its failure, were not part of the liability side of the "good"
banks,  nor did they stay in the residual ("bad") bank, in the sense  that the Central Bank
did not go as a creditor into the liquidation  phase. Instead,  the Central Bank  ceded  to
the Trust the assets  it had received  as collateral  to the mentioned  liquidity assistance
and, in exchange,  received  B Bonds,  thereby standing  as the second  claimant  in line vis-
a-vis the Trust. This treatment of Central  Bank  liquidity credits  can be construed  to be
lo SEDESA  contributed  an  IOU  (backed  by  future  FGD  receivables),  rather  than  cash,  because  the
FGD's  liquid  funds  had  been  fully  drained  in previous  cases  of bank  failures.10
consistent with  the priority of claims rules specified in Articles 49 and 53 of Financial
Institutions  Law (No. 21.526) for judicial  liquidation."
Similarly,  the claims of SEDESA on Almafuerte's assets -resulting  from the addition of a
SEDESA  IOU to the "good"  bank-  did not form part of the liability side of the "good"
bank nor did it integrate the  residual bank.  Instead, SEDESA  received C Bonds, thereby
standing third  in the queue vis-a-vis the Trust.  This treatment  of SEDESA  can be
construed to be consistent with the privileges it has under the Law only to the extent that
SEDESA  has better chances of recovering its resources by standing third  in line vis-a-vis
the Trust than  by standing ahead of non-guaranteed deposits vis-a-vis the judicial
liquidation.  That this  may be possible can be rather surprising  for a non-Latin American
observer.  However, the truth  is that  in Argentina, as in most of Latin America, the
liquidation process -whether  judicial  or extra-judicial-  tends to be staggeringly
inefficient, generally implying an excessive destruction of asset value.
The resolution of Almafuerte minimized  the size of the  residual  ("bad")  bank that
would go on to judicial  liquidation.  In the liability side, the  residual bank contained only
non-privileged liabilities,  i.e., Almafuerte's liabilities left after excluding those to labor,
depositors, the Central Bank, and SEDESA. In the asset side, the residual bank included
only the "bad" assets that  the Trusts would put back -assets deemed to be non-
recoverable or without  value.
3.  The Emerging  Model of Bank Failure Resolution-Issues
The resolution structure applied in the case of Banco Almafuerte was skillfully executed.
The securitization of assets achieved by the Trust arrangement  was innovative and
effective, in that it facilitated the quick transfer of the "good" bank.  In turn, the speedy
nature of the operation substantially  reduced the depositor uncertainty and distress often
associated with bank closures, thereby  minimizing contagion risk.  It  may be also argued
that this type of rapid, non-destabilizing resolution of troubled  banks has had and will
continue to have a positive feedback on banking discipline.  Quick, effective bank
"The  Central  Bank's  surrendering  of its rights on the collateral  to the Trust in exchange  for B
Bonds  is essentially  justified as a means  adequately  to protect  the interest of depositors. The
procedure  was  legally  challenged,  but the Argentine  courts ruled in favor of the Central  Bank,
dismissing  the challenge  in the first instance  and  also  after it was  appealed.11
resolution  removes  concerns  that supervisory  authorities  may have about the systemic
implications  of closing  a bank and, thus, is likely to foster tougher enforcement  and
earlier intervention  and resolution  of nonviable  banks. Moreover,  the authorities' current
effort to standardize  contracts  and procedures  involving  the Trust scheme,  should  further
enhance  the resolution  process. However,  as the authorities undertake  a systematic
review  of bank failure resolution,  a number  of general as well as Argentine-specific  issues
arise, pointing towards  areas where improvements  may be considered.
3.1.  The "all-deposits"  constraint
In 16 out of the 18 cases  of failed bank resolutions  carried  out in the period  July 1995-
April 1999, 100 percent  of the deposits  were covered  when applying  Art. 35 bis
procedures,  with the FGD  providing  a contribution virtually equivalent  to the full amount
of the guaranteed  deposits. Hence,  there is in Argentina  a systematic  tendency  to
include  all of the deposits,  regardless  of their size, in the liability side of the "good"
bank-  a tendency  which will henceforth  be referred to as the "all-deposits constraint".
This "all deposits"  constraint  is mainly of a practical  nature, for the liability side of the
"good" bank could be constructed  in line with the priority of claims  rules set out in Art. 49
of the Financial  Institutions Law,  which  would allow  applying  a pro-rata haircut to
uninsured  deposits. 12 This legal  flexibility, however,  is not normally used. A systematic
preference  exists to make  all depositors  whole  in applying  Art. 35 bis not only in order to
limit contagion  risk during bank closures  but also to maximize  the business  value of the
transferred deposits  to the institution assuming  them.  Reasonable  as these objectives
are, their achievement  comes  at some  increase  in moral hazard  and create  a bias
towards  rapidly depleting  the liquid resources  of the FGD.
The experience  with Banco  Mayo  confirms  that the "all deposits"  constraint implies  a
quick drain of the FGD's  liquid resources  in the resolution  of a middle-size  or large bank.
This is partly because,  prompt corrective  actions notwithstanding,  by the time the
supervisors  have enough  objective reasons  to initiate the closure  and resolution  of a
12  In 2 out of the 18 cases  of failed  bank resolved  to date using  Art. 35 bis -i.e., Banco  de Credito
Provincial and Banco Platense-  only around 60 percent of the deposits were separated and
transferred to acquiring institutions,  with the rest of deposits staying in the "residual"  bank--a
haircut based  Art. 49 of the Financial Institutions  Law (see Table 1).12
bank, the insolvency "hole" is typically determined (ex-post)  to have been significant.  In
each resolution SEDESA  could contribute to the asset side of the "good"  bank up to an
amount equal to the failing  bank's guaranteed deposits.  But the maximum  contribution
tends to be required in most resolution cases in order for available assets (including
SEDESA's  contribution)  to match all the deposits of the failing  bank.
With cash (or IOUs) from SEDESA  used to complete the required amount of assets in the
"good" bank, what was intended to be a limited deposit guarantee tends to become de
facto a full deposit guarantee, with  the FGD  standing to loose ahead of large depositors.
(Recall in this connection that  SEDESA  gets C bonds, compared to depositors whose
resources are backed by A Bonds.)  Annex 1 depicts this type of situation,  illustrating
also that a maximum contribution  from SEDESA  to the "good"  bank may be required
even in cases  where the failing  bank's insolvency is not particularly  deep -equivalent  to
10 percent of total liabilities  in the Annex's example.
There are, of course, ways to relax the all-deposits constraint  and control better the
contribution  of SEDESA  to the asset side of the good bank.  Given the trade-off  between
moral hazard and contagion risk, it would be presumptuous and plain wrong to think that
a simple recipe for a "right"  balance exists.  However, in assessing possible refinements
to their bank failure resolution system, the Argentine authorities  may wish review the
range of feasible policy choices and issues as set out below.
3.2.  Criteria  to construct the  liability  side of the "good"  bank
Key issues concern the procedures and criteria used to construct the asset and liability
sides of the "good" bank during the resolution phase.  As regards the liability side of the
"good" bank, the all-deposits constraint reflects a well-known  legal tradition  whereby
different classes of creditors  have different  priorities of claim vis-a-vis  available assets,
but there are no priority  of claim differences within a given class of creditors.
Accordingly, depositors as a class of creditors have a priority of claim over, say,
subordinated debt holders but individual depositors are treated alike, sharing pro-rata  in
the pool of available assets.  An explicit,  limited deposit insurance scheme alters this
scheme somewhat, as it gives guaranteed deposits a privilege over the non-guaranteed
ones in the event of a bank failure.  The logic of these priority  of claims rules, together
with a limited deposit guarantee scheme, contributes to the fact that,  in applying Art. 3513
bis, the liability side of a "good" bank tends to include either  all deposits or only
guaranteed deposits, normally with  no choices in between.
To escape the tendency towards these corner solutions, a rule would be needed to
establish a priority  of claim sequence among depositors, effectively  revising the
proportional criterion.  A natural candidate that would give maximum  flexibility  would be
an incremental  rule, according to which the limit  per depositor to be included in the
"good"  bank would be decided at the discretion of the resolution authorities.  The
authorities would have the freedom to raise such limit  gradually,  starting from the
guaranteed amount, up to the point where the amount per depositor is such that  liability
side of the "good"  bank is no greater than its asset side.  The examples provided in
Annexes 2 and 3 use this incremental rule in constructing the "good"  bank; however, as
deposit amounts cannot be shown along a continuum, they are shown in tranches (e.g.,
more than $30,000 but less or equal to $50,000, etc.).
This incremental rule would mitigate  moral hazard by giving operational  meaning to the
notion that smaller depositors have a priority of claim over larger ones.  The risk of loss
in the event of a bank failure for large depositors would give them an incentive to
monitor the condition of banks.  With appropriate  legal drafting,  the application of the
incremental rule could be circumscribed to the resolution phase, leaving the application
of the traditional pro-rata  criterion to deposits left in the "residual"  bank for liquidation.
The Argentine authorities  have recently proposed to Congress certain legal reforms,
including a rule that would help avoid the "all-deposits"  constraint.  Under the reformed
legislation, the liability side of the "good" bank could incorporate deposit amounts only up
to US$100,000.  But it there were an excess of assets in the "good" bank, deposit
amounts above that figure could be also included on a pro-rata,  rather  than an
incremental, basis.
Another issue in the construction of the liability side of the "good" bank concerns the
definition  of ineligible  liabilities,  i.e., those liabilities that should normally be left in
the "residual"  balance sheet to await the results of the liquidation.  To be sure, the
Argentine legal framework,  particularly though Art. 49 of the  Financial Institutions  Law,
already provides flexibility  to select liabilities to be included in the liability side of the
"good" bank in line with  certain priority  of claims sequence.  In fact, in the  18 failed bank14
resolutions executed since July 1995, some 22 percent of the total liabilities of the failed
bank were, on average, not separated and transferred with the "good bank" but rather
remained in the "residual"  balance sheet (see Table 1 above).
However, the current framework does not signal with sufficient  clarity that  certain types
of bank liabilities are ineligible, i.e., that they would be always left  in the "residual"
balance sheet in the event of a bank failure.  In particular,  it stands to reason to include
in the ineligible category the claims from bank creditors that  have special informational
advantages, to ensure appropriate  monitoring incentives and limit  moral hazard.  The
simplest way to achieve this would be by extending to the application of Art.  35 bis the
same logic already used in defining insured deposits for the purposes of liquidation  (see
footnote 5).  As a result, such liabilities as subordinated debt,  related-party deposits,
deposits by other financial institutions,  and deposits whose interest  rate exceed certain
level would all be ineligible.13
3.3.  Criteria  to construct the asset side of the "good" bank
The key issue in assembling the asset side of the "good"  bank concerns the
determination  of whether the Deposit Guarantee Agency (DGA) should make a
contribution and the size of it.  Following are the main options and issues in this regard.
One option that would maximize protection to the DGA resources and, hence, minimize
moral hazard, would be to define the deposit guarantee  as conditional  on asset
insufficiency,  implying that the DGA would make a contribution  to the "good"  bank only
if there are not enough assets in the failing  bank to cover guaranteed deposits.  The DGA
conditional contribution,  if triggered,  would be for an amount  no greater than what is
needed to honor the deposit guarantee.  To further  protect  its resources, the DGA could
be given a first-in-line  claim in the liquidation of the residual bank.1 4 To enhance the
13 In the absence  of a clear delimitation  of ineligible  liabilities,  inter-bank  deposits  related  to the
Argentine  subordinated  debt scheme  could  end-up  in the "good" bank, bailed-out  at the expense  of
FGD  resources.
14  This  alternative  could  be relaxed  without undermining  its spirit by allowing  the DGA  to advance
liquid resources  to facilitate  the resolution  process,  provided  that within a certain period  (and in
any  case  prior to the liquidation  of the residual  bank)  the DGA  recovers  in full such  resources.15
effectiveness  of bank failure resolution  process,  the incremental  rule mentioned  above
could be used  for the determination  of the liability side of the "good" bank.
A deposit  guarantee  conditional  on asset  insufficiency  implies  that non-guaranteed
deposits  would not benefit at the expense  of the DGA  and that bank failures would not
drain systematically  the DGA's  liquid resources. The trade-off is that such  guarantee  is
relatively  less  effective in limiting contagion  risk.  Annex 2 provides  a simplified example
of a bank resolution  under a regime  that combines  a deposit  guarantee  conditional  on
asset insufficiency,  on the one hand, and an incremental  rule, on the other. The example
illustrates  that, under that regime, the DGA  would tend not to be exposed  to a risk of
loss  even in the resolution  of a deeply  insolvent  bank (the bank in the example  has  an
insolvency  "hole" equivalent  to 50 percent of total liabilities), and even if asset  value
declines  significantly  under the liquidation (in the example,  non-cash  assets  loose  60
percent  of their value as a result of moving on to liquidation), but provided  that the level
of the deposit  guarantee is not too high.
At the other extreme  from the previous  option would be a "full" DGA's  contribution,
meaning  that the DGA  would  always inject resources  in the asset side of the "good" bank
in an amount equal to the guaranteed  deposits  of the failing bank, independently  of the
value of available  asset  in this bank. In exchange,  the DGA  would stand as a creditor in
the liquidation  of the residual  ("bad") bank. The example  in Annex 1 has been
constructed  to illustrate this regime.
A good  bank/bank  bank procedure  based  on a "full" contribution by the DGA  to the
"good" bank would provide  flexibility to protect all deposits  in most cases,  thereby
reducing  the trauma of a bank closure  and minimizing  the risk of contagious  runs on
other banks. This flexibility would be  valuable  particularly in the management  of
systemic  stress. The trade-off is, of course,  the increase  in moral hazard  because  large
depositors  would get bailed  out at the expense  of DGA's  loss. 15 A corollary  disadvantage
is that bank  failure resolution  would systematically  and substantially drain the liquid
15 Moral  hazard  could  be  offset  in some  degree,  however,  through  tight  supervision  and,
particularly,  early  intervention  and  resolution.  Early  resolution  takes  away  from  the  shareholders
and  administrators  of an  insolvent  bank  the  "captive"  depositor  funds,  thus  depriving  them  of the
wherewithal  with  which  they  could  take  on  excessive  risks  or loot.16
resources of the DGA. The more bank failure resolution approaches this  polar
alternative, the greater would be the need for backstop financing for the DGA. 16
3.4.  The "least  cost" criterion  and its implications
Between the two extremes  mentioned above, there are a continuum of alternatives
where the contribution  of the DGA to the "good"  bank is controlled through  some form of
least cost criterion.  For the purposes of this paper, the standard definition  of this
criterion implies that a good bank/bad bank type resolution should be implemented only
if it imposes a cost to the DGA that is no greater that the cost that the DGA would incur if
it were to pay out guaranteed deposits in cash, in exchange for a fairly  privileged claim
on the liquidation.  Four variables  affect  the potential  size of the  DGA contribution
to the "good" bank  under a least cost criterion:  (i) the size of the insolvency "hole"
of the failing  bank -ceteris paribus, the greater the insolvency the greater the potential
contribution  by the DGA; (ii) the priority  of claim accorded the DGA in the liquidation  -
the higher such priority,  the smaller the potential contribution  by the DGA; (iii)  the share
of guaranteed deposits in the liabilities of the failing  bank -the  higher such share, the
higher the potential contribution  by the DGA; and (iv)  the degree of loss in the value of
assets as they move into judicial  liquidation -the  greater the loss, the larger the potential
contribution  by the DGA.  Rather than examining in detail the effects of the various
combinations of these four variables on the contribution  by the DGA to the "good" bank,
it appears preferable to lay out two sets of general observations that  are helpful in
clarifying the policy options.
First, only benefits can be obtained from improving  and enforcing  prompt corrective
action and early  intervention  rules,  as these would reduce the probability that
insolvent banks continue to operate and minimize the size of the insolvency "hole" of a
bank subject to Art. 35 bis.  As a consequence, the soundness of the banking system
would be better protected and the DGA's resources would be less exposed to losses.
Similarly,  major  benefits could also be obtained from streamlining  the  liquidation
process, as this would  imply a lesser loss of value for assets under liquidation and, thus,
a lower risk of loss for the DGA under a least cost criterion.  Regardless of whether the
16 Under  Argentine-type  convertibility,  backstop  financing  to a DGA  could  not entail money  creation
by the Central  Bank; it would  have to come  from domestic  or, preferably,  external  debt.17
DGA stands first  in line or not vis-a-vis  the liquidation,  and notwithstanding  the
importance of minimizing the size of the residual bank for effective resolution, the least
cost criterion would yield a high cost to the DGA if asset value collapses in the liquidation
phase.  The foregoing considerations suggest that,  in reviewing bank failure resolution,
the Argentine authorities would do well in casting a wide net, so as to identify
improvements to both the antecessor phase (prompt correction and early intervention)
and the successor phase (liquidation)  of bank resolution proper.
Second, given the way in which least cost is calculated, the DGA's priority  of claim in
the  liquidation  makes a significant  difference  in its exposure to  risk of loss.  The
good bank/bad bank resolution examples in Annex 3 illustrate the two alternatives for
the DGA's  priority  ranking vis-a-vis  the liquidation,  namely, for the DGA  to  be (i) in the
same situation as non-guaranteed depositors, sharing with  them on a pro-rata  basis,' 7 or
(ii) first  in line, i.e., ahead on non-guaranteed depositors.
Sharing pro-rata  with  non-guaranteed depositors in the liquidation  necessarily entails
that the DGA offers some protection to these depositors.  The way this plays out in an
Art. 35 bis-type resolution  procedure is that the least cost calculation leads to a
significant contribution  by the DGA to the asset side of the "good"  bank, as is illustrated
by the example in Alternative A of Annex 3.  In contrast,  a first-in-line  priority  of claim in
the liquidation severely reduces the DGA's  exposure to risk of loss, even if the failing
bank is deeply insolvent and the loss of asset value under the liquidation  phase is
substantial.  This is illustrated  by the example in alternative  B of Annex 3, where the
least cost calculation leads to no losses for the DGA in a resolution of a failing  bank that
has an insolvency "hole" equivalent to 40 percent of liabilities  and whose non-cash assets
loose 60 percent of their  value by virtue of entering the liquidation stage.  Again, by
moving from the first  to the second alternative in Annex 3, flexibility  to control contagion
risk is sacrificed for the sake of reduced moral hazard.
The pros and cons of alternative positions in the priority  of claims ladder for the DGA
cannot be assessed independently of the liquidity  available to the DGA, the degree of
efficiency of the liquidation  process, the organizational arrangements in place, and the
incentives for maximum asset recovery.  Where liquidation  is carried out by the judicial
17 This  alternative  is featured  in the United  States  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  system.18
system,  as in Argentina,  efficiency  is likely to be low, implying a relatively  greater
collapse  in the liquidation value  of assets  and, hence,  low recovery  indices. In such
cases,  assigning  to the DGA  a first-in-line place  in the priority of claims ladder  would  still
give some  flexibility for least  cost procedures  such  as those of the Argentine  Art. 35 bis
(in the sense  that the DGA  would contribute  some  resources  to the asset  side of the
"good" bank). However,  it would  also reduce  the DGA's  interest in maximum  asset  value
recovery  from the liquidation  -once it gets paid, it would  have little interest in other
creditors  getting paid. Where  the liquidation  is carried out in a relatively more  efficient
manner, say, by the same  DGA  and using a broad range  of market based  techniques,  it
seems  better for the DGA  to share with other uninsured  depositors  in the priority of
claims ladder. If in this latter case  the DGA  were to be assigned  a first-in-line position
vis-a-vis the liquidation,  the least cost formula would yield a zero  or negligible  amount,
eliminating  desirable  flexibility needed  to carry out effectively  Art. 35 bis-type resolutions
and totally eliminating  incentives  for the DGA  to worry about maximizing  asset  value
recovery  in favor of creditors placed  after it in the order of priority of claims.  In sum, it
appears  that, unless  the net worth and liquidity of the deposit  guarantee  fund are
precarious,  flexibility and incentive  considerations  tilt the balance  in favor of assigning
the DGA  the same  position  in the priority of claims ladder  as other depositors.
3.5.  The asset-liability equivalence  constraint
Article 35 bis explicitly requires  that "equivalence" be maintained  between  the assets  and
liabilities  that are separated  from the failing bank and then transferred. While it is not
clear  why such  equivalence  is called  for under  the Law,  one can  certainly think of cases
where  the constraint would unnecessarily  hinder maximum  asset  value preservation  and
recovery. Assume  the failure of a bank where  the value  of "good" assets  significantly
exceeds  deposits. The equivalence  constraint would  force  to leave  "good" assets  in the
residual  bank,  with social  costs resulting  from the loss  of value of such assets  under
liquidation. Clearly, non-depositor  creditors would  be better off and depositors  would not
be worse  off if:  (i) a "good" bank containing  an excess  of assets  over deposits  were
constructed  and transferred; and (ii) the proceeds  from such  transfer (net of transactions
costs)  would be placed  -as they should-  in favor of the liquidation.
3.6.  Institutional arrangements19
The effectiveness of bank failure resolution is not independent of the organizational and
institutional arrangements that  house it.  This raises the general issue of whether the
responsibility for bank resolution should rest with  an independent, specialized institution,
separate from the banking supervision agency.  A number of incentives-related  reasons
appear to militate  in favor of a separate entity which, in practice, has tended to be a
publicly administered Deposit Guarantee Agency -such  is the case, for instance, of the
United States FDIC and Spanish FOGADE.
It  may be argued that  a separate deposit guarantee/resolution  agency would have (i) a
natural incentive to protect the integrity  of the accumulated guarantee fund;  (ii)  no
psychological resistance for early intervention and resolution of a failing  bank, as
opposed to bank supervisors who may tend to perceive their  role as one of preventing
bank closures, possibly even interpreting those closures as an admission of supervisory
failure;  and (iii)  specialized skills in bank failure resolution, skills that  are quite different
than those required for bank supervision.  Furthermore,  it would seem that  involving the
Central Bank too deeply in bank failure resolution processes could damage the credibility
of monetary and bank supervision policies.
These arguments have to be weighed against important  reasons, particularly  practical
ones, that can be advanced in favor or keeping bank failure resolution  powers with the
supervisory agency.  There is, in the case of Argentina, the credibility that that  the
Central Bank brings to the application of Article 35 bis, on account of its recognized
independence and proven professionalism.  More generally, there are likely to be
coordination gains and economies of scale (particularly  where skilled human resources
are in shortage and substantial learning by doing has already been accumulated) in
having the supervisory and resolution functions under the same roof.
3.7.  Legal protection
Resolving and closing a failed bank are extreme expressions of "enforcement"  which, if
delayed, gives rise to high social costs.  Hence, the prompt and effective execution of
resolution procedures requires solid legal ground as well as clear legal  protection for
the  bank failure  resolution  process itself  (lawsuits  should not suspend it)  and
for the  authorities  charged with  the  responsibility.  Authorities  need to be
protected against lawsuits initiated against them for actions carried out in good faith  in20
the performance of their official duties;  otherwise they would fail to act forcibly and in a
timely  manner.  Such protection, which is consistent with the first  of the Basle Core
Principles for Effective Bank Supervision, is unfortunately  weak in most Latin American
countries, including Argentina, and needs to be upgraded via suitable legal reforms.
As adequate legal protection for supervisory officials is achieved, it  is worth  putting in
place counterbalancing  elements.  For instance, an independent advisory body --
made up of knowledgeable and reputable people-- could be set up to survey the activities
of official supervisors and assess  fairness in the application of norms.  Or a quality
control unit could be established inside the supervisory agency to monitor compliance
with  supervisory guidelines.  Alternatively,  a supervisory authority  from another country
could be asked to provide a peer-group assessment against guidelines established by the
home supervisory agency.
3.8.  Argentine-specific  issues in least cost failure  resolution
Two specific issues are worth mentioning.  The first  concerns the current  lack of liquid
resources in the  DGF managed by SEDESA. These funds were depleted with the
resolution of Banco Mayo; moreover, as a result of the most recent resolutions, several
months of the Fund's future  receivables have already been mortgaged.  Such lack of
liquid resources does not necessarily imply insolvency for the DGF, as the present value
of its future stream of income from assessments may well exceed the (uncertain)  present
value of the cost of future  insurable events.  However, it does erode the credibility  of the
Deposit Guarantee and hinders the effectiveness of bank failure  resolution processes.  In
this connection, the Argentine authorities may wish to analyze the convenience and/or
feasibility of backstop financing for SEDESA,  secured by its future  stream of receivables.
Second, the Argentine authorities should consider suitable normative amendments to
widen the arsenal of contractual arrangements that can facilitate  the transfer  of a "good"
bank's assets -for  instance, "loss-sharing"  agreements that may improve the buyer's
incentives to maximize asset recovery.  The review of these alternatives  could prove
even more useful considering that the Trust  scheme used in the  case of Banco
Almafuerte  appears to lack adequate  incentives to promote  maximum  asset21
recovery."  More effective fee structures -compared  to the ones in effect at present-
could be easily designed.  In  particular, a low flat  fee could be set for the asset recovery
up to a conservatively estimated  minimum value, and an additional, proportional
(success) fee could be tacked on in relation to amounts recovered in excess of such
minimum value, hence providing the Trust manager with  upside potential  contingent on
effort.  The implementation  of revisions to the Trust contracts aimed at improving
incentives to maximize asset recovery is clearly needed in Argentina and should be
relatively straight forward.
And third, the particular financial engineering utilized in the resolution of Banco
Almafuerte raises issues in connection to the potential  payment  failure  by the  Trust
and the treatment  of A Bonds for regulatory  purposes.  To be sure, the over-
collateralization of the Bonds issued by the Trust clearly reduces the risk of default by the
latter,  particularly in respect of the (senior) A Bonds.  Nonetheless, it seems reasonable
to argue that there is a nonzero probability of nonpayment.  Recognizing this, the Central
Bank recently has created a contingent fund that would make payments on A Bonds in
case the corresponding Trust were unable to do so.  This fund is the result of a
"controlled"  regulatory forbearance scheme, according to which the banks that  acquire
"good" banks (in the context of the application of Article 35 bis) are allowed to constitute
part of the minimum  liquidity  requirement with  public bonds that yield a greater interest
rate than that earned on deposits in the Central Bank; the earnings attributable  to such
difference in rates feed the mentioned fund.  Given this scheme, the Central Bank allows
for A Bonds  to be recorded in the balance sheets at face value, without the need for
provisions.  Ingenious though it is, the scheme does reduce systemic liquidity,
insignificantly at this stage, but it could do it in a noticeable manner in the event of a
failure of a large bank or of several small to mid-size ones.
3.9.  Beyond Art. 35 bis:  voluntary  exit for  solvent  but nonviable  banks
The Argentine Central Bank authorities  have identified the need to complement their
failure resolution framework with  mechanisms to facilitate  the early, voluntary  exit of
banks that  are solvent but nonviable.  These banks may be considered nonviable  in at
18 In effect, early observations  on  the performance  of the Trust scheme  indicate  a tendency  for the
Trust process to be "captured"  by lawyers, with the consequent sacrifice of market-based financial
criteria.22
least two senses:  (i) they are on a trajectory  of deterioration that  would likely put
them within few years in capital or liquidity  conditions that would warrant their closure
under Article 35 bis; and (ii) their  net worth (defined as the going concern value of
assets minus liabilities),  albeit positive, is insufficient to offset the transaction costs
involved in, say, a merger or a take-over;  in other words, these would be banks that are
just  not worth the headache for a potential buyer.  The owners of these banks also see
no future in the long term and would thus be willing to close them and pay all the
creditors, without coercion from the supervisory authority,  but they cannot easily do that
because of the illiquidity  of the assets.  As these banks formally  meet the capital,
liquidity,  and other regulatory  requirements, the Central Bank lacks an objective basis to
enforce early closure in a legally unassailable way, despite projections of future
deterioration.  There is no voluntary  bankruptcy for banks in the Argentine legislation
and, even if it existed, Central Bank authorities see a need for alternative mechanisms
that  could be applied swiftly, quietly, and smoothly to facilitate  voluntary  exit of these
solvent but nonviable banks, thereby  minimizing adverse effects on the confidence in the
system, and without  exposing public sector resources to a risk of loss.
One scheme that the BCRA  is studying in this regard would involve the use of
resources  from the Bank  Capitalization Trust Fund (BCTF) to finance, say, 50
percent of deposit payouts.  Such lending would be secured by the exiting bank's assets
which, to avoid asset stripping,  could be put into a Trust.  The Trust could be managed
by the exiting bank administrators/owners,  who would have strong incentives to
maximize asset recovery given that they would receive the residual value, after all
creditors (including the BCTF)  have been paid.  If the recovery from the assets in the
Trust were insufficient to pay the BCTF,  SEDESA  could make a contribution  in line with  a
least-cost criterion to pay the BCFT. (Recall that SEDESA  is funded solely by the private
banking industry, without  any recourse to public funds.)  The authorities  consider that
the contribution  by SEDESA  would virtually  eliminate the risk of losses for the public
sector resources of the BCTF,  although some, relatively minor subsidy could be implicit  in
the interest rate charged on the loans by the BCTF,  a subsidy that could be justified  by
the positive externalities  derived from the early exit of solvent but nonviable banks.
While a good case can be made for a scheme to facilitate  the voluntary  exit of solvent
but nonviable banks, much caution and deeper analysis would  be needed to layout an
appropriate design, for there are a number of important problems. First, the scheme23
would require  substantial  amounts  of liquid resources,  but BCTF  is at present  virtually
emply. Second,  unlike SEDESA's  resources,  which are entirely of private sector  origin,
the use  of BCTF  resources  in any exit scheme  would, to one degree  or another, expose
public  funds  to the risk of loss,  a route that so far the authorities  have wisely succeeded
in minimizing  or avoiding. Third, the typical tendency  of bank owners  to overestimate
the value of their bank would tend to be a deterrent to an early willingness  to exit
voluntarily. Fourth,  for this sort of scheme  to work smoothly, all the creditors  of the
exiting bank have to get paid on demand  or at the moment  their claims matured,  without
applying  priority of claim rules. Any queuing based  on priority of claims rules would
prompt  large creditors to run on the bank the moment  they suspected  that a "voluntary
exit process"  may be initiated. And  fifth, even if the scheme  under study would offer
reasonable  protection  to public  resources  by maximizing  the probability of full repayment
to the BCTF,  it does  so at the risk of some  increase  in moral hazard: large depositors
and non-depositor  creditors  may get payment  at the expense  of SEDESA  losses,  even if
these losses  were limited by the least-cost  criterion.
Be it as it may, it must be emphasized  that any scheme  for the early exit of solvent but
nonviable  banks be integrated into a broader supervisory  strategy.  This strategy
would aim at: communicating  frankly to bank managers  the supervisor's  assessment  of
the bank's  viability, pointing towards  deterioration  trends; requiring  corrective  actions
and stepping  up enforcement  measures;  intensifying monitoring  to update  assessments
constantly,  prevent excessive  risk taking and, more generally, "shepherd"  the bank
towards  resolution,  including  by identifying  ways  to facilitate orderly shrinkage  (i.e., the
wind-down  of assets  to pay off liabilities).
4.  Concluding  Remarks
A deeper,  general issue  that permeates  most of the discussion  in this paper  is that of
rules versus discretion.1 9 Bank  resolution  is a complex  subject where  sound
judgement is essential,  which argues  for a degree  of discretion, particularly  in resolving  a
too-big-to-fail bank. Too much  discretion, however,  contributes  to lack  of transparency,
19  The  paper  in  fact  illustrates  that the issue  of rules  versus  discretion  emerges  even  if the
discussion  on  bank  resolution  is circumscribed  to a range  of difficult  but  still  "normal"
circumstances.  A fortiori, this issue  would  play  out in  an  even  more  acute  fashion  in  the context  of
"extraordinary"  circumstances,  e.g.,  a generalized  banking  crisis.24
erodes accountability,  and has attendant  moral hazard complications.  The "right"
balance is of course elusive, not the least because even in a rules-intensive system
aimed a minimizing moral, the too-big-to-fail  phenomenon would tend to undermine the
viability -and  hence the credibility-  of air-tight  rules.  To put matters  in some
perspective, however, it appears useful to outline two prototypical  approaches to sorting
out the balance between rules and discretion in the area of bank resolution.
The first  approach emphasizes the option value of discretion.  As a consequence, it has a
bias in favor of a bank resolution framework that would leave considerable, albeit  not
explicitly  stated, flexibility  to control contagion risk and bail out bank creditors in the
event of, say, a too-big-to-fail  case. The legal framework tends to be silent or vague on
the bailout possibility, 20 thus generating a high degree of "constructive  ambiguity".
Often under this approach, the management of a too-big-to-fail  case would require
emergency legislation.
The second approach, by contrast,  emphasizes the virtues  of rules.  It tends to favor a
bank failure resolution framework that  minimizes moral hazard and the risk of loss to the
DGA for all "normal"  circumstances.  However, it also provides for a potential  need to
control contagion risk in the case of a too-big-to-fail  bank, not by tacit or vague flexibility
embedded in the law, but via an explicit"rule"  or "escape valve".  This could take the
form of a contingent clause in the Law that  specifies the conditions under which, when a
too-big-to-fail  bank that could pose systemic risk arises, the deposit guarantee limit  can
be, by exception, raised to cover up to all deposits and, if needed, even up to all bank
liabilities. 2 '
20 In some  cases  (e.g., the Colombian  FOGAFIN  and  the Spanish  FOGADE),  resolution  frameworks
allow  flexibility to handle  too-big-to-fail  cases  by enabling  the Deposit  Guarantee/Resolution
Agency  to perform,  at its discretion,  "open-bank  resolutions",  i.e., taking control of a failing bank,
keeping  it open  to the public,  writing down  shareholders  capital, and injecting  fresh capital into it
as needed  to rehabilitate  and, eventually,  sell it.  The  cost of such  a operation  may well exceed  a
traditional  least  cost  criterion and may often imply a depositor  bailout  at the expense  of the DGA.
21 This second  approach  was  adopted  in United  States  by the FDIC  Improvement  Act of 1991.  It
introduced  a contingent  clause  according  to which,  when  handling  a failing bank,  the FDIC  can
extend  coverage  to bank  liabilities  beyond  the insured  amount  if there is a joint determination  by
the Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve,  the FDIC  Board,  and  the Treasury  Secretary  (after
consulting  with the President  of the United  States)  that the failure of such  bank would  entail
systemic  risk.25
That no simple answers are available in key areas of bank failure resolution -including  in
regard to rules versus discretion-  is not only due to their  inherent complexity.  It is also
a reflection of a void in the  development  of international  minimum  standards  for
bank resolution,  which is in part due to the relevance of differences in historical, legal,
and organizational traditions  among countries.  In effect, internationally  accepted "core
principles" such as those now in existence for banking supervision have yet to be
developed for bank "exit"  in general, and failure resolution in particular.  As a result,
there is little  international consensus as to what constitutes "best  practices" in this field,
which at the minimum calls for great caution in advancing policy prescriptions.  But as
the area of "bank exit" moves -as  it likely will-  into the priority  agenda for international
coordination efforts, the Argentine experience should constitute  an important  point of
reference in the Latin American Region, as it would seem to contain important  elements
of  "best  practices."26
ANNEX 1
Example of Bank Resolution under the  Emerging Model (a  la Almafuerte)
Simplifying assumptions:  Transactions costs are zero; non-cash assets are net of provisions; the going
concern value of assets is preserved during the resolution; assets become valueless under judicial liquidation.
The failing  bank's balance sheet:
Failing bank  Assets  Liabilities
Cash  10  2  Liabilities to labor
Non-cash assets  80  20  Guaranteed deposits
48  Non-guaranteed deposits
10  Liabilities to Central Bank
20  Other liabilities
-10  Capital
The failing  bank's non-cash assets are securitized via  a Trust, as follows:
Trust  I  Assets  Liabilities
Non-cash  assets  80  40  A Bonds (senior to  B Bonds)
10  B Bonds (senior to C Bonds)
20  C Bonds
10  Excess collateral for bonds
A "good"  bank is formed for all deposits:
"Good" bank  Assets  Liabilities
Cash  10  2  Liabilities to labor
A Bonds  40  20  Guaranteed deposits
IOU from Deposit Guarantee  Agency  20  48  Non-guaranteed deposits
0  Capital
The failing's  bank debt to the  Central Bank is settled with B Bonds:
The Central Bank releases to the Trust the failing bank's assets that had been the collateral for
a $10 past liquidity  loan, and receives $10 in B Bonds in payment for  such loan.
The Deposit Guarantee  Agency (DGA) receives C Bonds for its contribution  to the "good"  bank:
A $20 IOU from the DGA, equal to the amount of guaranteed deposits, is added to the assets
of the 'good"  bank.  In exchange, the DGA  receives C Bonds  from the Trust.  The DGA  in not
worse off compared to a cash payout of guaranteed deposits in exchange for a claim against
the liquidation because, by assumption, no value is recoverable through judicial liquidation.
The residual ("bad")  bank, containing the  rest the  failing  bank's liabilities,
moves on to judicial  liquidation...
Residual bank  Assets  Liabilities
Non-cash  assets  0  20  Other liabilities
The assets of the residual bank are those not retained in the Trust because they are deemed valueless.27
ANNEX 2
Example of Bank Resolution with (i)  an Incremental  Rule for Inclusion  of Deposits in the "Good"
Bank, and (ii)  a Deposit Guarantee Conditional on Asset Insufficiency
Simplifying assumptions:  Transactions costs are zero; non-cash assets are net of provisions; the going
concern value of assets is preserved during the resolution; non-cash good assets loose 60 percent of their value
under judicial liquidation.
The failing  bank's balance sheet:
Failing bank  Assets  Liabilities
Cash  5  5  Liabilities to labor
Non-cash  "good" assets  45  30  Deposits amounts < $30,000 (guaranteed)
Non-cash  "bad" assets  0  15  $30,000 < Deposit amounts < $50,000
20  $50,000 < Deposit amounts < $75,000
20  Deposit amounts > $75,000
10  Other liabilities
_  ____________________________ __  -50  Capital
Available good assets imply that  not all deposits can be included in the "good" bank;
an incremental  (not prorata)  rule is used to select deposits for the "good" bank
Since good assets in the failing  bank exceed guaranteed deposits, the  Deposit Guarantee
Agency makes no contribution to the  "good" bank
"Good" bank  Assets  Liabilities
Cash  5  5  Liabilities to labor
Non-cash  "good" assets  45  30  Deposits amounts < $30,000 (guaranteed)
$ from DGA  0  15  $30,000 < Deposit amounts < $50,000
0  Capital
The incremental rule dictates that only up to $50,000 per depositor can be included in the liability side
of the "good" bank.  Larger deposit amounts take a hit in the liquidation (see residual bank below).  The
Deposit Guarantee is conditional on assets being insufficient to cover guaranteed deposits, hence, in
this case, it makes no contribution to the "good" bank.  Due to the incremental rule and the
preservation of asset value within the resolution, smaller non-guaranteed deposits are clearly better off
than under the liquidation, while larger depositors are not necessarily worse off.
The residual ("bad")  bank containing larger deposit amounts and other
liabilities  moves on to liquidation...
Residual bank  Assets  Liabilities
Non-cash  "bad" assets  0  20  $50,000 < Deposit amounts < $75,000
$ from sale of "good" bank  ?  20  Deposit amounts > $75,000
0  Liability to  DGA
10  Other liabilities
?  Capital28
ANNEX 3
Example of Bank Resolution with  (i)  an Incremental  Rule for Inclusion  of Deposits in the "Good"
Bank, and (ii)  a Least Cost Criterion for the  contribution of the  Deposit Guarantee  Agency (DGA) to
the "Good"  bank
Simplifying assumptions:  Transactions costs are zero; non-cash assets are net of provisions; the going
concern value of assets is preserved during the resolution; non-cash good assets loose 60 percent of their value
under judicial liquidation.
The failing  bank's balance sheet:
Failing bank  Assets  Liabilities
Cash  5  5  Liabilities to labor
Non-cash  "good" assets  60  20  Deposits amounts '  $30,000  (guaranteed)
Non-cash  "bad" assets  0  40  $30,000  < Deposit amounts < $75,000
15  $75,000 < Deposit amounts < $125,000
15  Deposit amounts > $125,000
5  Other liabilities
-40  Capital
Alternative  A:
Available good assets imply that  not all deposits can be included in the  "good" bank; an incremental
(not prorata)  rule is used to give priority to smaller  depositors for inclusion in the "good" bank
For the  least cost criterion,  it is assumed that,  in the  liquidation, the  DGA has the same priority
of claim as that  of non-guaranteed  deposits, sharing with  them  prorata
"Good" bank  I  Assets  Liabilities
Cash  5  5  Liabilities to labor
Non-cash  "good" assets  60  20  Deposits amounts < $30,000 (guaranteed)
$ from DGA  15  40  $30,000  < Deposit amounts < $75,000
15  $75,000 < Deposit amounts < $125,000
0  Capital
Under  this alternative, given available assets, the incremental rule dictates that only up to $125,000
per depositor can be included in the liability side of the "good" bank.  Larger deposit amounts take a hit
in the liquidation (see residual bank below).  The least cost criterion implies that the DGA's  contribution
to the "good'  bank could not exceed a maximum (MaxC), usually defined as the cost to the DGA  of
paying out guaranteed deposits in cash in exchange for a claim against the liquidation.  Given the
assumptions regarding the loss of asset value and the DGA's priority of claim in the liquidation, MaxC
may be calculated as follows:
MaxC  =  GD - (GD/L)*(CA  +  LVNCA - LL)
MaxC =  20  - (20/100)*[5  +  (1  - 0.6)*60  - 5]  =  15.2
GD _ guaranteed deposits; L  3  total liabilities;  CA  _ cash assets; LVNCA  liquidation value of non-cash
assets; LL  liabilities to labor.
The residual  ("bad")  bank containing large deposit amounts and other  liabilities,
including the  claim of the  DGA, moves on to  liquidation...
Residual bank  |  Assets  Liabilities
Non-cash 'bad'  assets  0  15  Deposit amounts > $125,000
$ from sale of "good" bank  ?  15  Liability to DGA




Available assets for "good"  bank imply a need to exclude certain  (high)  deposit amounts;
such exclusion is performed  according to an "incremental  rule"
For the  least cost criterion,  it is assumed that  the  DGA has priority of claim over depositors
in the  liquidation, i.e., that  it stands first in line (after  labor claims)
"Good" bank  I  Assets  Liabilities
Cash  5  5  Liabilities to labor
Non-cash  "good" assets  60  20  Deposits amounts s $30,000 (guaranteed)
$ from DGA  0  40  $30,000 < Deposit amounts s $75,000
0  Capital
Under this alternative, given available assets, the incremental rule dictates that only up to $75,000 per
depositor can be included in the liability side of the "good" bank.  Larger deposit amounts take a hit in
the liquidation (see residual bank below).  The least cost criterion implies that the DGA's  contribution to
the "good" bank could not exceed a maximum (MaxC), usually defined as the cost to the DGA  of paying
out guaranteed deposits in cash in exchange for a claim against the liquidation.  Given the assumptions
regarding the loss of asset value and the DGA's priority of claim in the liquidation, MaxC  may be
calculated as follows:
MaxC =  GD - X
X = (CA + LVNCA  - LL) if  (CA + LVNCA  - LL) s GD
X =_  GD if  (CA +  LVNCA  - LL) > GD
(CA + LVNCA  - LL) = [5 + (1 - 0.6)*60  - 5]  = 24 > GD = 20
> MaxC  =  20 - 20 = 0
GD  e  guaranteed deposits; L _ total liabilities;  CA  cash assets; LVNCA  = liquidation value of non-cash
assets; LL_ liabilities to labor.
The residual ("bad")  bank containing large deposit amounts and other  liabilities,
including the  claim of the DGA (if  any),  moves on to judicial  liquidation...
Residual bank  Assets  Liabilities
Non-cash  "bad" assets  0  15  $75,000 <  Deposit amounts s $125,000
$ from sale of "good" bank  ?  15  Deposit amounts > $125,000
0  Liability to DGA
5  Other liabilities
?  Capital30
Argentina at a glance
Latin  Upper-
POVERTY  and SOCIAL  America  middle-  -
Argentina  & Carib.  income  Development  diamond*
1998
Population,  mid-year  (miiltons)  36.1  502  588  Life expectancy
GNP per capita (Atlas  method, US$)  8,970  3.940  4,860
GNP (Attasmethod, US$ billions)  324.1  1,978  2,862  T
Average annual growth, 1992-98
Population (Y.)  1.3  1.6  1.4  /
Labor  force  (%)  2.2  2 3  2.0  GNP  Gross
per  <  . primary
Most recent estimate (latest year available, 1992-98)  capita  enrollment
Poverty  (%  of  population  below  national  poverty  line)
Urban population (% of total population)  89  75  77
Life expectancy at birth  (years)  73  70  70  l
Infant mortality  (per 1,000  live  births)  22  32  27
Child malnutrition  (% of children under 5)  2  8  ..  Access to safe water
Access to safe water  (% ofpopulation)  65  75  79
Illiteracy (% ofpopulation age 15+)  4  13  11
Grossprimaryenrollment  (%ofschool-agepopulation)  113  113  108  Argentina
Male  114  ..  ..  Upper-middle-income group
Female  113
KEY ECONOMIC RATIOS and LONG-TERM TRENDS
1977  1987  1997  1998
Economic  ratios
GDP  (USS  billions)  56.8  111.1  292.9  298.1
Gross domestic investmentVGDP  30.9  19.6  19.4  19,9  Trade
Exportsofgoodsandservices/GDP  9.6  7.9  10.6  10.4
Gross domestic savings/GDP  33.2  19.9  17.2  17.4
Gross national savings/GDP  325  15.2  15.2  15.1
Current account balance/GDP  2.0  -3.8  *4.1  4.9
Interest paymentslGDP  1.0  3.3  2.1  2. t  Domestic  -- Investment
Totaldebt/GDP  20.2  52.6  42.1  497  Savings
Total debt service/exports  27.4  74.3  54.9  61.9
Present value of debt'GDP  . ..  40.9
Present value of debtlexports  ..  ..  329.0
Indebtedness
1977-87  1988-98  1997  1998  1999-3
(average  annual  growth)
GDP  0.4  4.4  81  3.9  4,2  Argentina
GNP per capita  -1.1  3.1  6.7  2.6  3.0  Upper-middle4ncome group
Exports of goods and services  1t3  8.8  12.0  9.2  4,5
STRUCTURE of the ECONOMY
1977  1987  1997  1998  Growth rates of output and investment (%)
(% of GDP)
Agriculture  ..  8.1  5.6  5.7  4-
Industry  ..  37.8  29.1  28.7  20
Manufacturing  ..  27.5  19.5  19.1
Services  ..  54.1  65.3  65.6  0  9
Private consumption  57.8  75.4  70.7  70.7  -2
Generalgovernmentconsumption  9.0  4.7  12.1  11.9  -GDI  GDP
Imports of goods and services  7.3  7.6  12.7  12.9
1977-87  1988-98  1997  1998  Growth rates of exports and imports (%)
(average  annua)  grrAth)
Agriculture  0.8  3.2  0.2  10.9  80
Industry  -1.3  4.3  9.9  3.2  6a
Manufacturing  -1.0  3.6  9.2  1.6  40
Services  1.7  4.8  7.7  4.7
25
Private consumption  ..  4.0  8.8  4.0
General govemment consumption  ..  1.4  3.2  -1.1  a3  94  96  97  98
Gross domestic investment  -0.5  8.4  17.7  6.6  20
Imports of goods and services  -1.3  21.0  26.6  8.4  - Exports  e  Impe,ts
Gross national product  0.4  4.5  8.1  3.9
Note: 1998 data are preliminary estimates.
' The diamonds show four key indicators  in the country (in bold) compared with its income-group  average. If data are missing, the diamond will
be incomplete31
Argentina
PRICES and GOVERNMENT  FINANCE
1977  1987  1997  1998  InflatIon (%/)
Domestic  prices
(% change)
Consumerpnces  176.0  169.2  0.5  0.9  20-
Implicit GDP deflator  159.5  127.8  -0.5  -2.0  10
Government finance  0 
(% of GDP, includes  current giants)  o  9  9  5s  a9  97  9
Current revenue  ..  15.0  18.7  18.9  -10
Current budget balance  ..  -3.0  -0.4  -0.3  - GDP deflator  OCPI
Overall surplus/deficit  ..  -6.4  -1.5  -1.4
TRADE
1977  1987  1997  1998  Export and  Import levels  (USS nmillions)
(USS  millions)
Total exports (fob)  ..  6,360  26,430  26,221  40.000
Food  ..  744  3,007  3,056
Meat  ..  655  1,025  835  000
Manufactures  ..  3,661  8,335  8,543
Total imports (cif)  ..  5,820  30,450  31 437  2000  . m iii
Food  . . ..  .oo 
Fuel and energy  ..  653  967  852
Capital goods  ..  973  14,823  15,587  0 11# 0  ,
92  93  94  95  96  97  98
Export pnce index (1995=100)  ..  81  102  97
Importpriceindex(1995=100)  ..  82  106  105  *Exports  aImports
Terms of trade (1995=100)  ..  99  97  93
BALANCE of PAYMENTS
1977  1987  1997  1998  curnent accountbalance to GDP ratio I%
(US$ millions)
Exports of goods and  services  6,588  8,134  30,940  30,822  °'
Imports of goods and services  4,712  7,627  37,241  38,326
Resource balance  1,876  507  -6,301  -7,504  I  'I  I I "
Net income  -781  -4,738  -6,171  -7,614
Net current transfers  31  ..  436  388
Current account balance  1,126  -4,239  -12,036  -14,730  4
Financing items (net)  719  2,070  15,309  18,168
Changes in net reserves  -1.845  2,169  -3,273  -3,438  4  -
Memo:
Reserves including gold (US$  millions)  ..  3,734  22,482  22,922
Conversion rate  (DEC,  loca/tUS$)  5.OOE-9  2.1OE-4  1.0  1.0
EXTERNAL DEBT and RESOURCE FLOWS
(US$  millions)  1977  1987  1997  1998  Composition  of  total debt,  1998  (USS  millions)
Total debt outstanding and disbursed  11,445  58,458  123,221  148,033  A.  7,188
IBRo  343  2,146  5.494  7,188  C;  5,442
IDA  0  0  0  0  G. 31,143
0:5,515
Total debt service  1,849  6,244  19,969  18,106  7D:31s  8
IBRD  46  224  635  725
IDA  0  0  0  0
Composition of net resource flows
Official grants  0  0  27  26
Official creditors  43  664  -110  549
Private creditors  384  940  10,954  8,682
Foreign direct investment  144  -19  3,569  2,382
Portfolio equity  0  0  214  -986  F: 91,427
World Bank program
Commitments  205  639  1,220  3,815
Disbursements  20  795  797  2,029  A-  IBRD  E- Bilateral
Principal repayments  20  133  299  350  B- IDA  D- Other multilateral  F- Pnvate
Net flows  0  662  498  1,678
Interest payments  26  91  335  375
Net transfers  -26  571  163  1,303
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